February 18, 2026 Millburn Township Charter Study Commission Meeting Minutes Minutes of the meeting of the Charter Study Commission of the Township of Millburn, in the County of Essex, New Jersey, held in the Bauer Center starting at 8:00 PM on the above date. Mr. Drucker welcomed those present and read the following notice: In accordance with Section 5 of the Open Public Meetings Act, Chapter 231, Public Laws, 1975, be advised that notice of this meeting was made by posting on the Bulletin Board in Town Hall, and forwarding to the officially designated newspapers, that this meeting would take place at the Bauer Center at 8:00 PM on Monday, February 18, 2026. All those in attendance joined in the Pledge of Allegiance. Upon call of the roll, the following Charter Study Commission members were recorded present: Corey Biller, Jerry Kung, Shaunak Tanna, and Christopher Drucker. Also present: Suzanne Cevasco, Esq. from King, Moench & Collins LLP, attending remotely via Zoom. Dr. Kung made a motion to revise the agenda to remove approval of February 10, 2026 since he had not had an opportunity to compile them. The motion was seconded by Mr. Biller. All voted in favor. Dr. Kung made a motion to approve the agenda, seconded by Mr. Tanna. All voted in favor. Reports Mr. Biller reported that he and Mr. Tanna would be speaking with the Chair of the Red Bank Charter Study Commission. They are also considering speaking to officials in Ridgewood, South Orange, Madison, Chatham, and Livingston. Public Comment Mr. Drucker opened the first public comment period. No one wished to be heard. Mr. Drucker closed the first public comment period. Old Business Mr. Drucker introduced the Commission's Preliminary Findings from TC Member Interviews. He noted that the presentation represents fact-based, preliminary findings — not yet recommendations — and that the Commission will explain the scope of its interview process. The attached Preliminary Findings document was presented to the public and read into the record. The presentation was delivered as follows: Chair Drucker presented the introduction and scope of interviews; Commissioner Parker-Lentz addressed partisan and nonpartisan elections; Dr. Kung addressed term length and election frequency, TC working relationships, and structural questions including governing body size and mayoral selection. Community Outreach� February 18, 2026 Millburn Township Charter Study Commission Meeting Minutes Ms. Parker-Lentz reported on the Commission's ongoing community outreach efforts. She noted that a Google Form will be released containing the same structured questions asked of TC members and municipal employees, so that members of the public may provide their own qualitative responses. The purpose of the form is to capture a broad range of justifications and viewpoints — not to produce a statistical count. She noted that the Commission has also been conducting personal outreach to individuals who ran for Township Committee but were not elected, and that civic associations are welcome to submit responses collectively on behalf of their members. Public Comment Mr. Drucker opened the second public comment period. Mike Becker, a Short Hills resident of fifty years, raised four questions. He asked whether Commission counsel is required at every meeting (Ms. Cevasco confirmed yes). He asked for the count of New Jersey municipalities that have changed their form of government in the last five to ten years and whether that trend is growing; the Commission noted this is part of ongoing Phase II research. He asked why Summit was not among the comparison towns; Mr. Drucker explained that Summit’s strong-mayor and ward-based structure reflects features that respondents have broadly disfavored, making it a less useful comparison. Finally, he raised a concern about the qualitative interview process. Dr. Kung provided a history of the charter revision process in New Jersey. Jeff Feld thanked the four current TC members who participated in public interviews and asked for clarification regarding how those public interviews relate to the private interviews conducted with former members. He asked whether the preliminary findings report would be made publicly available. He also asked whether the eleven former TC members interviewed in private would be identified by name in the Commission's report. Mr. Feld noted the finding regarding the prior Business Administrator's annual performance review — specifically, that formal annual performance reviews had taken place with the previous BA — and suggested this finding deserved prominent treatment in the Commission's public outreach materials. Mr. Drucker closed the second public comment period. Adjournment Mr. Tanna made a motion to adjourn, seconded by Mr. Biller. All voted in favor. The meeting was adjourned. ____________________________ Dr. Jerry Kung, Commissioner Charter Study Commission Secretary Approved: February 25, 2026� Preliminary Findings from TC Member Interviews February 18, 2026 Presenters: CD (Chair Drucker), JPL (Commissioner Parker-Lentz), JK (Commissioner Kung) PART 1: CD — Introduction and Who We Interviewed The second major component of our Phase I fact-finding has been a series of structured interviews with current and former Township Committee members. Tonight, I want to share what we heard. Before I do, I want to say something on behalf of the full Commission. The people who agreed to be interviewed for this process—both in private and publicly—gave us their time, their candor, and in many cases their willingness to be quite honest about things that didn't go well. These are individuals who devoted years of their lives to serving this community, often at real personal cost in terms of time, family, and sometimes professional complexity. Regardless of what we ultimately recommend, we owe them genuine respect and gratitude. We learned something important from every single conversation. To put the scope of this work in context: the Holmdel charter study commission interviewed 7 elected officials with a collective 60 years of TC service. Red Bank interviewed 7, reaching back 5 years. Bradley Beach interviewed 8. The 1972 Millburn Charter Study Commission described its record as spanning "a whole generation in the political life of this community," reaching back to the 1930s. Our Commission interviewed 15 current and former Township Committee members—more than any comparable commission we found—spanning more than 35 years of institutional memory and a collective 70 years of experience governing Millburn. Four of those interviews—with current Mayor Frank Saccomandi, Deputy Mayor Dave Cosgrove, Committeeman Ben Stoller, and Committeeman Jamie Serruto were conducted in public at our prior two meetings. The rest were conducted in private as part of our structured fact-finding. When counting interviews with 11 municipal employees, this Commission has invested approximately 60 hours of direct interview time alone. On every measurable metric, this Commission has gone to great lengths to ensure a thorough fact-finding process, and we believe the record reflects that investment. I'll note that we deliberately structured our questions consistently across all interviews, so that we could compare responses across eras and across parties. We asked everyone about time commitment, learning curve, term length, election frequency, partisanship, TC working relationships, council size, mayoral selection, the BA relationship, and their assessment of strengths and weaknesses. That structure allowed us to identify genuine patterns—and genuine disagreements. � Time Commitment and Learning Curve The time commitment required for TC service was consistently described as substantial—and frequently underestimated. Typical estimates ranged from fifteen to twenty-five hours per week for regular members, with the mayor or those carrying heavy board liaison assignments reporting significantly more. One current member described the mayoral role as "like having a second job." The learning curve was described as real and significant. Those who came in with prior board or professional experience—especially BOE service—generally reached effectiveness within a few months. Those without prior municipal experience consistently described year one as primarily a learning experience. And across the board, the transition from outgoing to incoming members was described as inadequate: little to no formal handoff, projects picked up midstream without context, and in some cases predecessors who made no contact at all. There was strong consensus—one of the clearest in our entire interview process—that formal onboarding and transition support is widely viewed as inadequate: structured orientation on municipal finance, civil service, procurement, and the Open Public Meetings Act; introductions to each department head; and ideally, contact with outgoing members before being sworn in. That brings me to the questions about how the structure itself serves—or fails to serve—the people we elect. Dr. Kung will share what we heard on term length and elections. PART 2: JK — Term Length and Election Frequency Thank you. I want to cover the areas where we heard some of the most consistent—and in some cases most emphatic—responses. Term Length A strong majority of respondents told us that three-year terms are not sufficient for TC members to be maximally effective. The arc that was described over and over: year one is largely learning; year two you start to hit your stride; year three you are either in campaign mode or in lame duck mode. One respondent described it this way: "by the time you reach certain initiatives, it's time to campaign and proposals get stopped." Another described the same arc differently: by the time you truly understand the job, you are already preparing to leave it. Most respondents favored four-year terms. Some caveated that with accountability concerns— what if someone turns out to be a poor TC member?—but those respondents often acknowledged that mechanisms such as recall and initiative can address this without shortening terms for everyone.� I want to be fair and note that a minority of respondents—particularly those with strong prior government experience or who served multiple terms who needed little ramp-up time— expressed comfort with three-year terms. Election Frequency If there was one issue that generated consistent, emphatic responses across almost all interviews regardless of era or party affiliation, it was annual elections. We heard this from members who served in the 1990s, from members who served in the 2000s and 2010s, and from those currently serving today. Annual elections were described as creating a perpetual campaign atmosphere — one that brings governance to a standstill, produces "complete exhaustion" for candidates and voters alike, and introduces high variability in TC composition year after year. Members described becoming reluctant to make difficult decisions before elections, projects being delayed or stopped for political reasons, and governance being interrupted year after year by campaign dynamics. The practical consequences were concrete. One respondent gave us a specific data point: during the 2021 Affordable Housing Settlement Agreement, the median tenure of the TC members involved was approximately eighteen months, with some members responsible for negotiating having served fewer than six months. The decision, they argued, was made with inadequate institutional knowledge—in part because of the constant churn produced by annual elections. Most respondents who weighed in supported moving to elections every two years where half the governing body turns over at a time, providing both continuity and accountability. The combination of four-year terms and biennial elections was described as the most impactful single structural change available. A subtler dimension of this issue also emerged from the testimony. Over a three-year term with annual elections, a single TC member may serve alongside as many as three entirely different cohorts of colleagues. This constant shift in composition makes it difficult for voters to evaluate any individual member's contribution — when governance succeeds or fails, it becomes hard to disentangle whether the outcome reflects a particular member's leadership or the specific combination of people serving alongside them at the time. That consistency of view is notable. But the next topic is where we heard the most genuine disagreement, and where the Commission believes it's important to present both sides clearly and evenhandedly. I’ll now hand it over to Ms. Parker-Lentz. PART 3: JPL — Partisanship Partisan vs. Non-Partisan Elections I want to be direct: this is a genuinely contested question. We heard substantive arguments on both sides. I'll try to present them fairly.� Both camps agreed on one thing: road maintenance, DPW operations, public safety, budget mechanics—these have no inherent partisan dimension. Multiple respondents across party lines stated that local issues simply do not map onto national party platforms in any meaningful way. Where they disagreed was on whether party labels serve a useful function in elections, and whether partisan structures help or hurt governance. Those who favored retaining partisan elections argued: Party affiliation gives voters a general signal about a candidate's philosophy on spending, fiscal policy, and governance priorities. Even if imperfect, this information has value. One respondent described "a framework in someone's mind" based on political disposition—and argued party labels make that visible. Party infrastructure provides practical support for candidates: financial resources, organizational backing, and help getting a campaign off the ground. Several respondents—particularly from earlier decades—described this as especially important for "citizen" candidates who might have good ideas but no political profile. Primary elections give voters two opportunities to evaluate candidates and can serve as a vetting mechanism. Without party structure, some respondents worried that organized special-interest groups could more easily dominate non-partisan races. Those who favored non-partisan elections argued: Party labels actively mislead voters. Multiple respondents described candidates being tagged with a party position they did not hold—most often on development and housing issues— causing voters to reject or support people based on an inaccurate association. One respondent asked us: if a candidate's voting record is clearly different from what the party label implies, does the label inform the voter or misinform them? Partisan structure deters qualified candidates. Multiple respondents described approaching strong potential candidates who declined because they didn't want to take a party label—people whose employers have pay-to-play concerns, whose professional contexts make partisan affiliation complicated, or who simply don't subscribe to either party's full platform. One respondent: "we've had great people say they can't bring themselves to take a party label." The structural disadvantage extends to the demographics of the electorate itself. Approximately 43.4% of Millburn's registered voters — more than 7,200 people — are unaffiliated. Under a partisan system, any of them who wants to run for local office faces an immediate structural barrier: affiliate with a party and subject yourself to its vetting, loyalty expectations, and internal political dynamics — or attempt to run as an independent against the full organizational weight of a party machine. As one respondent put it, partisan elections "potentially keeps 45% of voters � from running because they are unaffiliated and they would have to pick a party in order to run." Multiple respondents described the requirement to affiliate with a party and submit to its vetting as precisely the thing that deters many otherwise-qualified people from stepping forward. Perhaps most significantly, several respondents described receiving direct pressure from party leaders on how to vote on specific governance decisions—not just on who to support in elections, but on actual TC votes. The concern was articulated directly: "TC members often feel they owe their party something, which makes for bad decisions." This was not hypothetical—it was described as personal experience by more than one respondent. There is also a legal dimension that rarely gets discussed. Under New Jersey law, when a TC seat is vacated — by resignation, death, or any other cause — the seat is filled not by voters but by the county committee of the party of the departing member. Party organizations have formal appointment power over who sits on this governing body between elections. Residents who voted for a particular person may find their seat filled by someone chosen entirely by party insiders, with no public process at all. And the record raises a harder question about what party committee support actually signals. Party organizations coordinate across local, county, and state levels. They have their own institutional interests — advancing the party agenda, identifying candidates who can be trusted to stay in line, and treating TC service as a rung on a larger political ladder rather than a commitment to this community. Candidates who earn party backing have demonstrated they can be counted on to advance those interests. That's a different thing entirely from demonstrating you can govern Millburn well. Several respondents in this camp argued that party committee backing signals something more specific: a demonstrated willingness to play the game — to cultivate relationships with county chairs and district leaders, to signal loyalty before demonstrating competence, and to accept that an endorsement carries obligations into office. Those qualities, they argued, are a different thing from governing capacity, and function in practice as the real screening criteria in a partisan system. The concern, as one respondent put it, is that TC members end up feeling they owe their party something — and when that happens, it produces decisions that advance party interests rather than town interests. National politics bleeds into local races in ways that have nothing to do with local governance. Multiple respondents described campaigns in which national issues were invoked in TC races where they had no bearing whatsoever. And beyond the governance effects, several respondents described partisan labels as opening the door to civic divisiveness they viewed as out of place in local elections. The toxic polarization of national politics — which, in their view, has nothing to do with road repair, zoning, or public safety — bleeds into local campaigns, crowding out substantive conversation about local priorities. In a town where neighbors share the same streets, schools, and parks, these respondents argued there is no local purpose served by importing that kind of division.� Multiple respondents pointed to our own Board of Education as evidence that non-partisan elections work in Millburn. The BOE has operated with non-partisan elections throughout its history and has attracted strong and diverse candidate fields. Finally — and perhaps most fundamentally — several respondents raised the question of who actually ends up in office. One respondent put the standard simply: "we need people who are intellectually honest with the issues and approach them apolitically." The concern articulated by multiple respondents in this camp: a partisan system filters for those who navigate party committees successfully — candidates who have demonstrated loyalty to the party — rather than those best suited to govern. The strongest potential candidates — professionals with employer pay-to-play constraints, people who refuse to pledge party loyalty as the price of public service, those who approach local issues on their merits — are often exactly the ones the partisan system turns away, in this view. One current member put it plainly: in his professional life he has never hired anyone based on party affiliation, because it has no bearing on the job — and argued that voters should have the same opportunity to evaluate the actual person, their judgment and qualifications, rather than a label. Complications the Commission noted on both sides: We want to be transparent that both sets of arguments have tensions worth naming. On the arguments for partisan elections: one respondent argued that party alignment was essential for access to county funding, but when asked about their actual experience, acknowledged that direct outreach mattered more than party membership—and expressed doubt that a mayor of the opposite party would be turned away. One respondent argued party labels inform voters, but separately acknowledged a party had successfully mislabeled a group of candidates on a housing issue—suggesting labels can mislead as readily as they inform. One respondent argued that using TC service as a stepping stone to higher office was a legitimate reason to retain partisan structure. Others viewed this as precisely the problem: a governing body whose members are focused on proving themselves to a party machine is a governing body whose loyalties are divided — between the town and the party. And the argument that partisan structure gives voters two shots through primaries deserves scrutiny: in New Jersey, primaries are restricted to registered members of the party holding the primary and independents — members of the opposing party have no voice. And locally, primaries have historically been uncontested, meaning they have not in practice served as a genuine platform for candidate differentiation. On the arguments for non-partisan elections: the concern that without party infrastructure, reaching voters could depend more on personal resources is worth naming. One current member acknowledged that running without a party label is genuinely difficult when party-line voting gives an automatic structural advantage to whoever carries the label. But that same member pointed to Millburn's own BOE elections as the relevant empirical test: contested BOE races feature significantly lower campaign spending than partisan TC elections, and consistently draw � broader, more diverse candidate fields — suggesting, in that member's view, that non-partisan elections lower rather than raise the financial barriers to candidacy. On the party committee concern: respondents who raised it also noted that the BOE has operated with non-partisan elections for decades without party organizations coming to dominate those races. And there is a broader point that respondents on this side of the debate articulated: knowing how to earn a county chair's endorsement, cultivate district leaders, and navigate party loyalty dynamics is a fundamentally different skillset from knowing how to govern a town well. Multiple respondents argued that if party committee support is the gate through which candidates must pass, the selection mechanism screens for political aptitude rather than governing capacity. The Commission's observation: This is one of the most genuinely contested questions in our record. Views appeared to divide largely along lines of era of service and direct personal experience with partisan pressure on governance. We have presented both the arguments and their complications to the public. The Commission is not making a recommendation tonight. We want the public to have the full landscape before we proceed to Phase II. Dr. Kung will now address what we heard on TC working relationships and the structural questions around governing body size and mayoral selection. PART 4: JK — Working Relationships, Council Size, and Mayoral Selection Thank you. I want to cover three areas: the question of governing body size and mayoral selection. Governing Body Size: Five vs. Seven This question produced a genuine split. Let me give you both sides. Those who favored expanding to seven argued that five creates real operational constraints. With a three-person quorum and Open Public Meetings Act restrictions on outside communication, building consensus is structurally difficult—one respondent described being limited to "only one-on-one conversations" before meetings. A single vacancy or recusal can threaten decision￾making capacity. On workload: five members responsible for all committee and board liaison assignments produces people who are, as one respondent described, stretched across the equivalent of a multitude of separate commitments. Seven members would allow for a more manageable distribution of work and deeper expertise in each area. Subcommittees of three are also more functional than two—a tie can be broken, and recommendations are more authoritative.� Regarding organizational capture: with five members, securing a majority requires only three votes — a threshold that coordinated outside pressure can more plausibly reach. With seven, a majority requires four votes, and the larger and more diverse body provides built-in resistance: it is harder to corral more votes, and more likely that any organized push will encounter opposition from within the body itself. A larger governing body provides a structural buffer against well￾organized special interests seeking to drive a particular outcome. Those who favored retaining five raised concerns primarily around recruitment: fifteen to twenty-five hours a week of TC service is already a significant ask, and finding qualified candidates is already challenging. Though as multiple respondents on both sides acknowledged, if elections become less frequent and the process becomes non-partisan to include unaffiliated residents, that recruitment challenge becomes considerably more manageable — which changes the calculus significantly. Mayoral Selection: Directly vs. Indirectly Elected A majority of respondents favored moving to a directly elected mayor. But before presenting the arguments, I want to flag something important that we encountered in our interviews: many people initially conflated a directly elected mayor with a *strong* mayor—meaning a full-time executive with independent authority over departments. That is a very different form of government from what most respondents who support direct election actually want. When we clarified the question—asking about a directly elected *weak* mayor, with the same limited presiding-officer role as today but chosen by voters rather than by the TC—opinions often shifted. With that distinction in mind: Those who favored direct election of a weak mayor argued primarily that the current internal selection process generates recurring conflict and dysfunction. This was described across every era we interviewed: backroom dealing, hurt feelings, and coalition-building that damages TC cohesion and governance quality—including during years when a single party controlled all five seats. One respondent described the process as "unsustainable" and creating "disunity and disharmony that affected governance in the months leading up to budget." Direct election would give the mayor a public mandate and remove the internal selection process entirely. They also argued that public understanding matters: most residents do not know the mayor is selected by the TC rather than elected by them. A directly elected mayor—even with the same limited authority—would be more clearly accountable and easier for the public to understand. Those who favored retaining the current system cited the equal standing of all TC members as a value worth preserving. If the role is truly "first among equals," direct election may create a perceived hierarchy without a functional one. Some felt the dysfunction around mayor selection was a product of partisan politics and would diminish under a less polarized system—without requiring a structural change.� On the question of a strong mayor: the Commission found near-universal opposition. A strong mayor requires a full-time professional commitment that, in a community like Millburn where most residents are professionals, would restrict the candidate pool. It would displace professional management with elected management in ways that most respondents believe would reduce quality and continuity of services. One respondent described it plainly: "a strong mayor would be an absolute disaster." Multiple respondents who supported direct election were explicit that the position should remain weak—a presiding officer and public face—with professional management through the BA. Business Administrator Structure If there is one finding that the Commission can describe as truly unanimous, it is this: every single respondent who addressed the question supported maintaining a strong Business Administrator as the professional manager of township operations. Across thirty-plus years of service, across party lines, across very different governance philosophies—this was universal. Respondents described the BA variously as "essential," "absolutely essential," the thing that "runs the town," the single most important factor in Millburn's operational quality. Several attributed Millburn's reputation for excellent services directly to the stability and professionalism of this position, noting that we have had only two BAs in approximately forty years. The concern about what would happen without it was expressed with unusual vividness. "It would be ridiculous for elected officials to be heading the departments." "Take the professional management structure away and you'd have a very different—and much worse—result." "Chaos." Respondents who supported a directly elected mayor were explicit that this would not—and should not—alter the BA's authority or role. The directly elected position they envision is a public representative and presiding officer, not an executive displacing professional management. A few respondents identified structural vulnerabilities in the BA relationship worth addressing going forward: the BA currently lacks formal protection against arbitrary removal, which creates political vulnerability; there is no formal annual performance review despite the position's importance. Such annual performance rev At-Large Elections On ward-based versus at-large elections, we found near-unanimous agreement. Respondents across all eras opposed ward-based elections for Millburn. The concerns were consistent: the Millburn/Short Hills geographic dynamic would be amplified by ward boundaries; at-large members have an obligation to represent all residents rather than fighting for their particular section; and the potential for parochialism—"which neighborhood's street gets paved first"— would undermine the unity of purpose the TC needs to function. I’ll now hand it back over to our Chair, who will summarize these findings.� PART 5: CD — Summary Summary Let me close by offering the Commission's overall characterization of what we heard. Millburn's current form of government works reasonably well in favorable conditions—when the right people are serving, when political dynamics are manageable, when the BA and TC members are strong. And those conditions describe today. But we heard, consistently, that the form depends heavily on the people rather than the structure. The structural issues that emerged most consistently were: First, annual elections were consistently described as creating more governance disruption than accountability benefit—this was the most consistent pattern across all interviews regardless of era or party. Second, the BA structure is the most important structural strength. Third, at-large elections are broadly preferred; respondents across eras characterized ward￾based representation as likely to amplify geographic divisions and produce parochialism. Fourth, the learning curve and transition are real problems. Fifth, both governing body size and mayoral selection have documented structural problems — the operational constraints of five members and the recurring dysfunction of internal mayor selection were described consistently across multiple eras of service. And sixth, partisan elections generated the most genuine debate—with views dividing largely along lines of era of service and direct personal experience with party pressure on governance. The Commission heard substantive arguments and substantive complications on both sides, and presents this as a question requiring careful public consideration. These are preliminary findings. We are not making recommendations tonight. We have more analysis ahead—including a Phase II process where we will be reaching out to other municipalities to hear about their experiences. Thank you for your attention and your continued engagement in this process.�